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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, Debra Williams (hereinafter referred to as "Debra) and defendant, Johnnie
L. Williams (hereinafter referred to as "Rocky") were married on November 19, 1993. Debra
had one child at the time of the marriage. Rocky adopted that child shortly after the parties'
marriage. The parties originally lived in Oregon but moved to Idaho in 2003. The parties owned
a home in Oregon and sold it in 2002. They reinvested the net proceeds of approximately
$85,000.00 in a home in Rigby, Idaho in 2003. They made improvements on the property
including building a barn. The parties lived as husband and wife in Idaho from 2003 until their
divorce on October 24, 2012.
Debra filed for divorce on September 9, 2011, alleging irreconcilable differences. Rocky
filed a counterclaim also alleging irreconcilable differences. Neither party claimed fault as a
basis or grounds for the divorce. The parties specifically stipulated to a divorce on the grounds
of irreconcilable differences at the commencement of the trial. (See Memorandum Decision,
page 5, paragraph 14)
Debra is employed with the Department of Energy earning $98,187.00 per year or
$8,182.25 gross income per month. Rocky is totally disabled and has been on Social Security
Disability effective 1992. Rocky's monthly Social Security benefit is $1,315.00 per month.
Upon entry of the divorce, Rocky will be required to pay approximately $210.00 per month for
Medicare Parts C and D, thereby reducing his monthly income to approximately $1,090.00 per
month. (See Memorandum Decision, page 3, paragraphs 6 and 7)
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Rocky Williams is 5 7 years of age. Rocky is a juvenile diabetic. He is legally blind in
his left eye because of a detached retina. Rocky has a prosthesis for a right eye. He has ulnar
damage to both his arms. He has had a kidney transplant and takes anti-rejection medications.
He has had a pancreas transplant which also requires him to take anti-rejection medications. He
has artificial knees in both legs, is missing a toe, and has poor balance. It is painful for him to
walk as he has severe neuropathy in his feet. Rocky has braces for both his shoes which help
with his mobility. (See Defendant's Exhibit B)
Vocational expert Dr. Richard Taylor testified that Rocky was occupationally disabled
and not employable in the competitive market place.
A divorce trial occurred on August 20 and August 22, 2012, before the Honorable Judge
Penny J. Stanford. At trial, the Rocky requested an unequal division of property and debts
and/or an award of maintenance. Rocky also requested payment of his attorney fees by Debra
pursuant to Idaho Code § § 32-704 and 32-705. Rocky specifically requested that he be awarded
the community home, or that it be sold, and that Debra be required to pay the community debts.
The Trial Court entered its Memorandum Decision on September 15, 2012, and entered
the Decree of Divorce, over Rocky's written objection, on October 24, 2012. Rocky's objection
to entry of the Decree of Divorce as written was that it did not address the property equalization
payment from Debra to Rocky. (See Objection to Entry of Decree of Divorce filed on
October 17, 2012)

8

The Trial Court found specifically that Rocky was fully occupationally disabled, and that
his only source of income was Social Security Disability. The Trial Court divided the personal
property and retirement plans agreed upon by stipulation of the parties and by further order for
those items tried to the Court. The Trial Court awarded the community home to Debra; ordered
Debra to pay the community debts; and, required Debra to pay maintenance to Rocky in the sum
of $600.00 per month for five (5) years or until Rocky remarried, died or began residing in an
assisted living or nursing home facility. Rocky was required to move from the community
residence thirty (30) days from the entry of the Memorandum Decision on September 5, 2012.
The Trial Court denied an award of attorney fees to Rocky.
Rocky filed his final Notice of Appeal on November 1, 2012.
The District Court issued its Opinion on Appeal on June 17, 2013.
Rocky filed his Notice of Appeal to this Court on July 19, 2013.

IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

The Trial Court did not adequately prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law

as required by Idaho Court Rule 52(a).
2.

The Trial Court erred as a matter of law by admitting generalized and remote

allegations of alleged fault against Rocky and utilizing those generalized allegations of alleged
fault as a basis to deny adequate maintenance and attorney fees to Rocky.
3.

The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and fact by not requiring the community

home be listed for sale and sold to the highest offeror.
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4.

The Trial Court erred as a matter of law by not awarding substantial and

permanent maintenance to Rocky.
5.

The Court erred in not awarding Rocky his attorney's fees and costs in this matter

pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 32-704 and 32-705.

V. ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
Rocky hereby requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 32-704 and
32-705, and any and all other applicable rules and statutes.
Spouse's receipt in divorce proceedings of assets in form of property division sufficient to
pay attorney's fees does not necessarily preclude award of attorney's fees to the spouse. Current
statutes now mandate that courts in divorce proceedings consider elements besides necessity and
value of assets awarded in property division in deciding whether award of attorney fees is
appropriate. Even if each party's "financial resources" remains primary factor in evaluation of a
request for attorney fees, that term means more than balance sheet assets; in its broader meaning,
it includes income and earning capacity. Stephens v. Stephens, 138 Idaho 195, 61 P.3d 63 (2002)
Idaho appellate decisions state that a disparity in the income of the parties is generally sufficient
to justify an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 32-704. Jensen v. Jensen, 128 Idaho at
606, 917 P.2d at 763 (Idaho 1996); Pieper v. Pieper, 125 Idaho 667, 671, 873 P.2d 921, 925
(Ct. App. 1994).
In its amended form, Idaho Code § 32-704(3) now directs the trial courts to look at not
only the financial resources of the parties but also "the factors set forth in [Idaho Code]
§32-705," which are enumerated above. Plainly, the current statutes now mandate that courts in
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divorce proceedings consider elements besides necessity and the value of assets awarded in the
property division in deciding whether an award of attorney fees is appropriate. Stephens v.

Stephens, supra.
In Stephens, supra, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of fault in the context of
maintenance under Idaho Code§ 32-705. The court found that the fault criteria was met when
the court found Mr. Stephens guilty of extreme cruelty. Mrs. Stephens pled extreme cruelty, and
the issue was tried. The magistrate found extreme cruelty and thus the fault requirement under
Idaho Code§ 32-705(l)(g) was met. I have found no case suggesting that undefined,
uncategorized, and unspecified fault not pled by one of the parties may be used as an element in
deciding the award or non-award of maintenance or attorney fees.

VI. ARGUMENT
A. REQUIREMENTS OF IDAHO COURT RULE 52(A)
FINDINGS BY THE COURT
In any action tried upon the facts without a jury, the court is required to find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. If an opinion or memorandum
decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw appear therein.
A written memorandum decision issued by the Court may constitute the findings of fact and
conclusions oflaw only if the decision expressly so states or if it is thereafter adopted as the
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw by order of the court.
A reviewing court may reverse the trial court's decision when findings are absent or
inadequate. Clayton v. State, 118 Idaho 59, 794 P.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1990)
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Findings of fact and conclusions oflaw properly set forth by the court, must be supported
by substantial and competent evidence. Carney v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 985 P.2d. 1137
(1999)
Clear error will not be deemed to exist if the courts findings are supported by substantial
and competent, though conflicting evidence. Muniz v. Schrade, 115 Idaho 497, 767 P.2d 1272
(Ct. App 1989)
Only where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete understanding
of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning will the absence of findings of
fact not result in a remand for adequate findings. Spencer v. Idaho First National Bank,
106 Idaho 316, 67 P.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1984)
Unlike review of findings of fact, the appellate court has free review over conclusions of
law. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 946 P.2d 975 (1997)
Where a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, not being supported by substantial and
competent evidence, the finding must be set aside. Moye v. Moye, 102 Idaho 170, 627 P.2d 799
(1981), Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102 Idaho 870, 643 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1982), Lang v. Lang, 109
Idaho 802, 711 P.2d 1322 (Ct App 1985)
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AS REQUIRED BY IDAHO COURT RULE 52(A)
The Trial Court herein issued a Memorandum Decision which disregards mention of
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision does not
comply with Idaho Court Rule 52(a).

A written memorandum decision issued by the court may
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constitute the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw only if the decision expressly so states or if
it is thereafter adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law by order of the court.
The Memorandum Decision issued by the Trial Court in this matter does not separately
state the findings of fact or conclusions oflaw as required by Idaho Court Rule 52(a). The only
exception to compliance with the mandate of Idaho Court Rule 52(a) is where the existing record
is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete understanding of the material issues and the
basis of the magistrate's reasoning. Otherwise, absence of findings of fact will result in a remand
for adequate findings. The record herein is not clear and in some instances void, as to various
findings made by the Trial Court.
Our Court of Appeals made a very pronounced and important observation when it
addressed the importance of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law in Dondelinger
v. Dondelinger, 107 Idaho 431,690, P.2d 366 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984)
Most importantly, the requirement of explicit findings encourages
a trial judge to rely upon objectively supportable grounds for his
decision, and discourages subjective or attitude-influenced
perceptions of the case. Without that objective basis, trial court
fact-finding is, as Judge Jerome Frank once observed, a "soft spot
in the administration of justice." J. Frank, Courts On Trial 74
(1950)
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT
AND SEPARATE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE
1.

Finding Regarding Community Property And Debt

The Trial Court specifically found on page 13, paragraph 27 of its Memorandum
Decision:
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"Rocky wants half or more of all community property with Debbie
paying all the house payments and pay all of the community debt,
and to continue making all his house payments for the rest of his
life. His position to this court is vindictive, indefensible and
illogical."
There is insufficient substantial and competent evidence to support that his request was
vindictive, indefensible and illogical. There is no objective evidence to support this conclusion.
It is submitted that this may be one of those subjective, attitude influenced perceptions warned of

in Dondelinger, supra. Rocky was a long term spouse, who is blind, disabled, and 57 years old
with significant health issues. Why is it vindictive, indefensible and illogical for a man in his
circumstances to want a home in which to live and have a decent life? Rocky cannot support
himself, and is a classic example of a person entitled to substantial and permanent maintenance.
The evidence clearly establishes Debra's ability to pay, and Rocky's absolute need. However, the
Trial Court demeaned Rocky and found that it was preferable to burden society with his future
care and housing costs rather than his long term spouse.
2.

Finding Regarding Fault To Justify Unequal Division Of Property

The Trial Court found at page 13, paragraph 27 of its Memorandum Decision:
"It is Rocky's conduct and demands that justify an unequal
division of property in Debbie's favor."

The court made no finding at to what conduct to which the court was referring. Whatever
the conduct, it must have been perceived by the Trial Court to be serious, but without findings of
fact we will never know. This punitive "finding" was made by the Trial Court even though the
Trial Court said it was not going to order a divorce on the grounds of fault. It is submitted that
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this may be another example of subjective attitude influence perceptions which occur when the
Trial Court fails to perform the objective process of identifying facts. The Trial Court ignored
the fact that each party agreed that it was a no fault divorce, and abused her discretion in
pursuing and finding fault.

3.

Finding Regarding Home Value

The Trial Court found at pages 17 and 18, paragraph 36 of its Memorandum Decision:
"There is more owing on the home than it is worth."
There is no evidence in the record other than the testimony of the parties as to their
determination of the home's value. The market analysis, which is not an appraisal, obtained
earlier in the year was not the best, most competent evidence on this issue. Debra testified that
her only basis for her value was the market analysis. Rocky testified that he believed the property
to be worth $300,000.00 to $350,000.00 based on an appraisal the parties obtained three years
earlier indicating a value of $300,000.00. (Tr. P. 293, L. 16-25)

4.

Finding Regarding Medicare Coverage For Assisted Living Centers

The Trial Court found at page 19, paragraph 39 of its Memorandum Decision:
"Because of his disability Rocky could live in a socially viable,
functionally appropriate living facility with only minimal expenses
not covered by Medicare."
There is no evidence in the record on this issue, and further, Medicare does not pay for
assisted living centers, only nursing homes which are clearly distinguishable.
The Trial Court erred in concluding as a matter of law and fact that Medicare paid for
assisted living centers. The Appellate Court has free review of errors of law. The court can take
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judicial notice of Medicare regulations which clearly establish that assisted living centers are not
paid for by Medicare for any individual. It is only when all assets and resources are exhausted
that one may be placed on Medicaid, and placed in a "nursing home", which is far less desirable.

5.

Finding Regarding Resources And Social Life At Assisted Living Facilities

The Trial Court found at page 19, paragraph 39 of its Memorandum Decision:
"At such a facility, or group housing, he would have access to
resources and sociality which he now lacks and says he wants. He
would have assistance with basic living issues for which he now
needs help, such as health monitoring wound monitoring,
housekeeping, medication management and transportation."
There is no evidence on this issue, and the court erred in making this finding.

6.

Finding Regarding Rocky's Income And Cost Of Living

The Trial Court found at page 19

20, paragraph 39 of its Memorandum Decision:

"All this could easily be done within his current income and
without further assistance."
Once again, the court concluded without evidence, that the personal cost of living in
assisted living centers was covered by Medicare. The Trial Court's maintenance order
specifically includes and expands this error, by stating that the $600.00 per month maintenance
terminates upon entry into an "assisted living" or nursing home facility.
7.

Finding Regarding Quality Of Life At Nursing Home

The Trial Court found at page 20, paragraph 39 of its Memorandum Decision:
"The quality of a person's life can be very high in such a facility."
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There was no testimony at trial describing the virtues of assisted living centers, and
whether people residing in such facilities considered the quality of their life to be very high. I
suspect many would take issue with this statement in particular as it pertains to nursing homes.

8.

Finding Regarding Government Assistance And Rocky's Support

The Trial Court found at page 20, paragraph 40 of its Memorandum Decision:
"Government assistance is substantial and where such assistance is
available the court must consider these resources as assets and
means available for Rocky's support whether he chooses them or
not." (emphasis added)
The finding and/or conclusion is not supported by any substantial and competent
evidence in the record. The court does not identify a single item of government assistance, nor an
amount which is available to Rocky. It is a bare conclusion without support in the record. The
only testimony related to the availability of outside resources for a disabled blind man was
through Rocky's wife Debra. The question and answer presented in Court were as follows:
Question: "Okay, what facilities in town are you aware of that
would take people who have the same disabilities that Johnnie has
that are paid for by Medicare?" (Tr. P. 382 L. 21-24)
Response: "I went online and I -I can't remember the name of the
places. I don't have it in front of me, but I did go online to find
apartments that are not necessarily assisted living centers, but
apartments that allow for people who are disabled and are on
Social Security Disability and then I also went online and looked
to see if there were facilities in town that did offer some assisted
living, you know, nurses that come in but you have like to own
your little apartment and then there's a community of people."
(Tr. P. 383 L. 15-24)
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9.

Finding Regarding Rocky's Means Of Support

The Trial Court found at page 20, paragraph 40 of its Memorandum Decision:
"Rocky's only means of support is his disability payment of
$1315.00 per month and his eligibility for other government
assistance."
There was no evidence presented that Rocky was entitled to or was eligible for any other
government assistance. There was no evidence as to any amounts or financial benefits
attributable to him even if such were true. This finding is clearly erroneous.

10.

Finding Regarding Rocky's Tangible Assets And Government Resources

The Trial Court found at page 20, paragraph 41 of its Memorandum Decision:
"Rocky will have these tangible assets in addition to his
governmental resources."
This is a finding unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. There is no
evidence in the record establish any government resource Rocky was eligible for, or if eligible,
the amount of the resource.

11.

Finding Regarding Court's Assignment Of Fault In Divorce To Rocky

The Trial Court found at pages 20

21, paragraph 41 of its Memorandum Decision:

"The parties agreed to have the divorce granted on essentially no
fault grounds, yet the courts conclusion is that were the grounds
left for decision by the court, the court would have faulted Rocky's
behavior and attitudes for the divorce."
The court made no findings of fact with regard to this conclusion. There is no way to
clearly determine what facts support this conclusion. The evidence of fault was meager and
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minor, much occurring seventeen (17) to eighteen (18) years earlier. Further, the Trial Court
failed to identify what fault under Idaho Code§ 32-603 it found.
Rocky submits that the evidence on fault improperly admitted was of such an
insignificant nature that it does not justify the Trial Court's perception of Rocky.

12.

Finding Regarding Rocky's Request For Asset Distribution And Support

The Trial Court found at page 21, paragraph 43 of its Memorandum Decision:
"Rocky's request from the court for distribution of most of the
assets, none of the debts and lifetime support shock the common
sense of the court."
This finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Trial Court
made no finding as to why a blind disabled man's request for an unequal division and lifetime
maintenance shocked the common sense of the court.

The conclusion conveys the state of mind

and personal feelings of the Magistrate, as opposed to conclusions based on fact and law. This
conclusion is not based upon objective facts, but an attitudinal perception only.

13.

Finding Regarding Attorney's Fees

The Trial Court found at page 21, paragraph 43 of its Memorandum Decision:
"This case went to trial because rocky wanted a pound of flesh. He
didn't get it, and he is not getting attorney fees either."
Counsel for Rocky wishes to submit and respectfully inform the court that the attorney
for the appellant has a genuine and deep respect for the presiding Magistrate, and has no wish to
offend. However, these types of conclusions may well qualify as a situation referred to by the
Supreme Court, Dondelinger, supra, which may have been avoided by appropriate findings of
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fact and conclusions oflaw. Rocky respectfully submits that the Afemorandum Decision
contains subjective or attitude-influenced perceptions of the case, without objective basis.
There is no evidence supporting this finding. The Trial Court disregarded and discounted
Rocky's blindness, disability, unemployability, lack of a residence, and minimal assets and
concluded that Rocky's wishes were only based upon vindictiveness. Once again, this finding is
a reflection of the feelings of the Magistrate personally, and not based on substantial and
competent evidence. The court made no clear findings with regard to Idaho Code §§ 32-704 and
32-705, other than as contained in its Memorandum Decision, pages 21

22, paragraph 43.

D. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING FINDINGS
CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
1.

The court failed to make a finding that the defendant did not have sufficient

property and income to enable him to care for his future personal needs.
2.

The court failed to analyze and make findings as to Debra's ability and

opportunity to dispose of non essential assets to decrease her monthly expenses. Debra's
financial statement included in Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, to identify additional resources available to
provide maintenance to Rocky. A review of Plaintiffs Exhibit 6 indicates several expenses
which can be eliminated or reduced.
The Court erred in permitting the Debra to continue a lifestyle with recreational vehicles,
extra vehicles, and savings, instead of requiring the defendant to liquidate unessential assets to
enable her to pay substantial and permanent maintenance.
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3.

A portion of Debra's outstanding debt could be reduced by selling personal assets

unnecessary for her standard of living. Debra testified she was residing with her boyfriend, and
paying him only $550.00 per month. (Tr. P. 68, L. 13) There was no evidence that this would
not continue in the future. The court should have maximized the parties' assets by placing the
home for sale, at Rocky's uncontested opinion of value of $300,000.00. Debra resides with her
boyfriend and Rocky cannot afford the home. The elimination of the mortgage debt would result
in a potential savings of $1,250.00 per month. Debra also had a recreational vehicle with a
payment of $221.00 per month; (Tr. P. 62, L. 9-14) and a new big screen television payment as
well as a payment for a new refrigerator. Debra was also contributing to a TSA saving plan in the
sum of $150.00 per month. (Tr. P. 88, L. 3) Debra further agreed she could discontinue a
FSAHC Plan which cost her $115.00 per month, (Tr. P. 88, L. 5) and that the costs for health
insurance would decrease upon divorce. Debra further requested to retain the home which has a
mortgage payment of $1,800.00 per month, and utilized that figure to justify not being able to
pay maintenance. The court failed to make findings of fact as to the excess available if these
expenses were eliminated and the house sold. Were the house sold, it could conceivable provide
Debra an additional $1,250.00 per month for alimony.

E. THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT REQUIRED
FOR ANALYSIS OF IDAHO CODE §§ 32-704 AND 32-705
The court omitted entirely the elements ofldaho Code§§ 32-704 and 32-705. However,
the necessary components to satisfy the requirement for attorney fees are clearly available from
the record. If the court disregards the Trial Court's erroneous conclusion that Rocky has
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"government resources", Rocky's only source of income is his net Social Security income is
$1,090.00 per month. The Trial Court correctly found that Rocky was not employable, and that
his condition will worsen. (Memorandum Decision, Pages 8 - 10, Paragraphs 19, 20, 21 and 22).
The Trial Court found that Debra earns $95,400.00 per year. However, the trial testimony of
Debra was that her income was $98,187.00; (Tr. P.82, L. 16-20). The court accepted without
question Debra's discretionary deductions for life insurance, savings and prepaid medical to
arrive at a net pay of $5,327.36 per month. The court accepted Debra's budget, which included
savings and payments on recreational vehicles, at $4,723.53. Debra's budget, (Plaintiffs Exhibit
6) contains includes the following:
Debra's Monthly Take home pay: $4,916.00 (Note: Court found $5,327.36)
House payment: $1,800.00 (should have been ordered sold)
Trailer payment: $225.97 (recreational vehicle which can be sold)
Pickup Payment: $616.00 (used to pull trailer, not primary source of transportation)
Debra testified that the reason she needs the pickup is to pull the camp trailer, and that
she and her boyfriend are using the trailer; that she could sell them both if she wanted to; that she
has a car which is reliable transportation; that she wants the pickup and trailer for recreation; that
she could sell them both and reduce her debt. (Tr. P. 105, L. 17-25: P. 109, L. 17 - 25;
P. 110, L. 1-8)

If the home were sold, and the proceeds used to pay off the mortgage, and if the pickup
and trailer were sold, those figures combined with the $150.00 Debra is placing in savings each
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month result in to a total of $2,310.00 available funds for payment of maintenance. Debra will
argue that the parties are upside down on the home, which is a matter yet to be determined, as the
home has not been placed on the market for any such determination to be made.
Debra is 53 years of age, earning over $98,000.00 per year, and enjoying her life with
two vehicles, a travel trailer, living with her boyfriend, saving money each month, and insisting
on relegating Rocky to an assisted living center for which she erroneously believes Medicare will
pay. Our society expects better treatment of long term spouses, and as a result invoked statutory
resources to protect them.
The Trial Court failed to make the essential finding required by Idaho Code § 32-704
pertaining to attorney fees. Rocky testified he had no way to pay his attorney fees, and asked that
Debra pay them. Rocky stated that if he had to pay his fees, he would have to liquidate his share
of the retirement, and use it for fees, leaving him little left. (Tr. P. 365, L. 15-24)
Current statutes now mandate that courts in divorce proceedings consider elements
besides necessity and value of assets awarded in property division in deciding whether award of
attorney fees is appropriate to that spouse. Idaho Code§§ 32-704(3) and 32-705. Each parties'
"financial resources" remains a primary factor in evaluation of request for attorney fees in
divorce action. However that term means more than balance sheet assets; in its broader meaning,
it includes income and earning capacity. Idaho Code§§ 32-704(3), 32-705, Stephens v. Stephens
138 Idaho 195, 61 P.3d 63 (2002)
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There are numerous appellate decisions stating that a disparity in the income of the
parties is generally sufficient to justify an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 32-704.
Jensen v. Jensen, supra, Pieper v. Pieper, supra.
In its amended form, Idaho Code § 32-704(3) now directs the trial courts to look at not
only the financial resources of the parties but also "the factors set forth in [Idaho Code]
§ 32-705," which are enumerated above. Plainly, the current statutes now mandate that courts in

divorce proceedings consider elements besides necessity and the value of assets awarded in the
property division in deciding whether an award of attorney fees is appropriate. Stephens v.
Stephens, supra
F. THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE A FINDING OF FACT OR
CONCLUSION OF LAW RELATING TO THE PARTIES
GROUNDS AND DIVORCE

The court failed to make a finding of fact or conclusion of law as to its apparent finding
of fault. The court erred in considering evidence of fault when fault was not pled, and further did
not make a conclusion of law as to which fault ground under Idaho Code § 32-603 it found. The
court did not identify the evidence which it considered as competent and substantial evidence of
fault.
G. ERRORS OF LAW
1.

The Court Erred In Admitting And Finding Fault

The court recognized each party sought and pled for divorce exclusively on the ground of
irreconcilable differences. Neither alleged a fault. At trial, the court permitted evidence of fault,
over objection, indicating it was for purposes of maintenance. The court disregarded the
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pleadings and permitted evidence of fault.

The court concluded as a matter of law that there

was fault on the part of Rocky, without identifying the fault, nor identifying what the fault
consisted of. The magistrate court erred in allowing fault evidence, and secondly, utilizing
unspecified, uncharacterized, generalized fault as a basis to deny maintenance and attorney fees.
Though fault was not pled, the court devoted pages 5 through 8, as well as pages 13 and 15 of the
22 total pages in its Memorandum Decision to find fault. Counsel for Rocky objected several
times, finally obtaining the court's permission for a continuing objection to fault testimony. (Tr.
P. 24, L. 12, P. 30, L. 10-14)
Rocky's counsel argued that fault per Idaho law requires notice and proof of a specific
type of fault, i.e. adultery or extreme cruelty. Counsel for Rocky argued that unless Debra
alleged a fault ground, and provide a specific fault ground that it was error to consider minor
disagreements or disputes as a factor for determining maintenance. (Tr. P. 27, L. 4)
The court responded: "where the grounds are irreconcilable differences normally that
takes care of it, but I'm going to allow the question and the answer for whatever weight it is
given". (Tr. P. 25, L.11)

If the court was correct in admitting fault not pled, the court erred in not making a finding
with regard to the Debra's admission of adultery. (Tr. P. 369, L. 11-18)
The court committed error by disregarding Idaho Code § 32-603, by failing to identify
and characterize the fault.
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2.

The Court Erred In Denying Fees And Costs Based On A Conclusion Of
Fault, And An Erroneous Conclusion That Rocky Was Entitled To
Government Benefits

The court failed to address the elements ofldaho Code §§ 32-704 and 32-705 adequately.
The court did not find specific fault, nor declare the plaintiff to be an innocent spouse. Further,
the denial of attorney fees was partially due to the court's erroneous and unsupported finding that
Medicare pays for assisted living centers. Neither fault nor Medicare coverage, nor availability
of government assistance should have been an element of the Idaho Code § 32-704 analysis, if
made.

3.

The Court Committed An Error Of Law By Failing To Order The Home
Sold, And By Awarding The Home To One Of The Parties At A Disputed
Value

There was no expert testimony with regard to the value of the home. Debra's opinion
was based entirely upon what she earlier viewed as a market analysis prepared by a real estate
agent, and Rocky based his opinion that the home was valued at over $350,000.00 based upon an
appraisal the parties obtained three years earlier. The market analysis was submitted to the court
by Rocky in June, 2012, in response to a pretrial order January 30, 2012. The pretrial order
stated in summary, that if the divorce involved a division of property and debt, that the parties
were required to do one of the following within 21 days:
a.

File a notice stating they do not own real estate.

b.

File a stipulation as to the vale and interests.

c.

File a notice if the parties desire the court appoint and expert witness to appraise.
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Neither party produced an expert as to the value of the home, but each testified as to his
or her value of their real estate. Rocky testified that his home was appraised 3 years earlier, for
an amount in excess of $300,000.00. There was also a question as to whether the appraisal
included the barn. (Tr. P. 101, L. 16 -25; P. 201, L. 1-11)
The sale of the house would free up funds for maintenance by eliminating the large
encumbrance and the monthly payment thereon. The comi left Rocky as a obligor on the home
for the rest of his life, thereby prohibiting him from acquiring another home if he were able. Left
as is, Rocky will never have a home.
Rocky testified that the parties refinanced the home three years previously and the value
then was $350,000.00. Rocky testified that this value was obtained via an actual appraisal and
that the appraisal was obtained three (3) years earlier. (Tr. P. 293, L. 16-25; P. 294, L. 1-3)
Rocky testified that he did not believe the market decreased significantly on "horse property"
such as this. (Tr. P. 294, L. 4-13) Rocky described the property as a 4,200 square foot home on
four (4) acres with water rights, irrigation systems, two car garage and barn. (Tr. P. 294, L. 1125) Rocky requested that the home be listed for sale, and that the price reduced periodically if
necessary until it could be sold. (Tr. P. 296, L. 5-9)
Debra submitted no other evidence of value.
H. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DID NOT REQUIRE AN EQUALIZATION PAYMENT
FROM THE PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDANT
The personal property division between Debra and Rocky is not equal. Debra is
receiving $21,492.00 in personal property and Rocky is receiving $16,925.00 in personal
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property. The Decree must to reflect an equalization payment from Debra to Rocky in the sum
of$2,283.50 ($21,492.00 - $16,925.00 = $4,567.00 + 2 = $2,283.50) (See Decree of Divorce,
Exhibit "C", page 8 and Exhibit "D", page 9)
This matter was brought before the court, post Decree at hearing on Defendant's
Objection To Entry Of Divorce Decree. The court denied the motion without explanation.
I. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO
AWARD ROCKY LIFETIME MAINTENANCE
The court ordered that Debra pay to Rocky $600.00 per month in maintenance, which
was to terminate at the end of five (5) years or Rocky's admission into any assisted living center
or nursing home, whichever was sooner. This sum provides Rocky with only $1,697.00 net
income on which to live. The denial of Rocky's request for fees will cause him to pay a
substantial portion of his only asset to his attorney. Rocky cannot survive on the combined sum
of $1,097.00 from Social Security Disability (net) and the $600.00 maintenance award. As stated
by the court Rocky will be "cast on public welfare rolls and deprived of dignity and self respect
healthy people take for granted."
Rocky is an active productive individual who has much to offer. Rocky is only 57 years
old. Rocky is bright, intelligent, and has a lot of ambition. Rocky is capable of performing work
around a house, maintenance, and many things which give him joy. Rocky is adamant that he
does not want to be immediately stored away in a nursing home for the rest of his life. Rocky
wants and deserves to enjoy the rest of his life and be busy doing things he likes and is able to
do.
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Before moving here, though blind, he tutored at Agothay Christian School, where he was
acting vice principal in title. Rocky helped design and build cabinets and remodel the kitchen.
(Tr. P. 170 - 172)
After purchasing their home, though blind and disabled, Rocky methodically hauled rock
from neighbors' properties and decorated around trees, lined ditches, and fence lines; he dug up
rocks and lined them around trees. Rocky taught kids how to shoe horses; helped a neighbor
build cabinets in his garage; (Tr. P. 172) and built wood forms for cement culverts on his
property. (Tr. P. 174, L. 1-6) Rocky uses live-in students and individuals for house care and meal
preparation in return for rent. (Tr. P. 176, L. 1-15) Rocky can cook many items with the use of
the microwave. (Tr. P. 177). A Home Health nurse visits Rocky regularly to make sure his needs
are met. (Tr. P. 180-181) Rocky does his own laundry. (Tr. P. 182, L. 9-10). Rocky can use a
computer and uses a magnifying glass to read. (Tr. P. 185) Rocky can drive a four wheeler, fmd
his way around house, and navigate a riding lawn mower. (Tr. P. 190) Rocky has never been
house bound, and is active outside continually. (Tr. P. 191) Rocky spent two years hauling
rocks. He fed horses, dogs, and kept busy. Rocky spent roughly six (6) hours a day outside doing
something constructive. (Tr. P. 231, L. 12-25) Rocky completed the electrical work in the
parties' barn, over a four month period in the cold of winter. (Tr. P .232, L. 14-16) Rocky stated
that he spent seven (7) years improving the outside of his property, memorized the entire piece
mentally, crawled every inch of the property both praying on it for his family and building on it.
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Rocky has memorized the house so that he can find his way around it well. This includes the
house, outside areas, and the barn. It is all he knows and he wants to stay.
(Tr. P. 235, L. 5-15)
Expert testimony was provided by Dr. Richard Taylor, a vocational rehabilitation expert
and director of the Disability Services at BYU Idaho. Dr. Taylor thoroughly evaluated Rocky
and concluded that Rocky was occupationally disabled, and unable to work be employed in a
competitive labor market. (Tr. P. 200, L. 3-8) Defendant's Exhibit B, contains Dr. Taylor's
report of his evaluation of Rocky and was admitted as evidence. Dr. Taylor concluded that
Rocky was capable of volunteer work, but that his condition would not improve. Dr. Taylor
described Rocky adeptly:
"Social Security Disability or other forms of disability doesn't
mean that they are absolutely handicapped to the point they can't
do anything. It just means the idea of pace and persistence and
ability to work a full workday and the limitations imposed prevent
them from doing the kinds of jobs that are found in the competitive
labor market .... There's a great deal of difference between the
competitive labor market and folks who work even in sheltered
environment, let alone people who volunteer to do things. It's
really not the same." (Tr. P. 203, L. 11)
The Idaho Appellate Court was faced with a similar appeal in Hentges v. Hentges, 115
Idaho 192, 765 P.2d 1094 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988). In Henteges, Bill was disabled, unemployable,
saddled with ongoing expenses, requiring a greater share of the community property. It was a
nineteen (I 9) year marriage, The Hentges court ordered a substantially unequal division of
property. The court empathized with the disabled spouse, and commented that the substantial
unequal division was morally required:
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"In this sense it gave him, so far as money suffices, a measure of
dignity and independence that healthy people take for granted."
Henges, supra
Primary consideration in awarding maintenance is financial condition of parties. Tisdale

v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331,900 P.2d 807 (1995)
One should not be cast onto public assistance rolls and become a burden on society if he
or she is unable to care for her or his self and the former spouse has the ability to contribute to
her support and maintenance. Olsen v. Olsen, 98 Idaho 10,557 P.2d 604 (S.Ct. 1976)
A spouse is entitled to spousal maintenance, where marital and separate property
accorded to spouse in divorce action and spouse's potential employment opportunities are
insufficient to day-to-day needs. Theiss v. Theiss, 112 Idaho 681, 735 P.2d 992 (1987)
Idaho Courts have historically awarded long term disabled spouses permanent alimony
where they were unable to meet their needs through the property awarded and their future
income. McNelis v. McNelis, 119 Idaho 349, 806 P.2d 442 (1991); Mulch v. Mulch, 125 Idaho
93, 567 P .2d 967 (S. Ct. 1995); Ross v. Ross, 103 Idaho 406, 648 P .2d 1119 (1982); Sullivan v.

Sullivan, 102 Idaho 737,639 P.2d 435 (Idaho 1981)
This finding is not objectively based in the record, and is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence.

J. THE COURT ERRED IN LAW BY CONCLUDING
ROCKY WAS GUILTY OF FAULT
Debra's counsel elicited questions regarding a volatile relationship over continuous
objection. Fault was not pled, and cannot be an issue at trial. (Tr. P. 25
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26). Upon Rocky's

counsel's objections to testimony regarding any alleged fault, the court responded on page 27
lines 1-5:
Court: "well I'm going to give you some leeway on that because
the statute does say in paragraph (g) to sub paragraph 2 of
§ 32-705 does discuss fault, but I agree with you to a certain extent
Mr. Swafford so I am going to give you some leeway, but I don't
want to spend too much time here. (Tr. P. 27, L. 1-5.)
The Trial Court permitted continuation of testimony of eighteen (18) alleged events
occurring eighteen (18) years earlier. Counsel for Defendant requested and was granted a
continuing objection with regard to all fault testimony. (Tr. P. 30, L. 10-14)
The Trial Court concluded summarily without any specific findings, that Rocky was at
fault, and expounded upon it at length in its Memorandum Decision, on Pages 13-14, Paragraph
27 and Pages 20-22, Paragraphs 41 and 43.

Description Of Alleged Fault Testimony:
Debra was permitted to continue testifying about fault over objection as stated above. A
description of the fault shows that even if properly considered, did not rise to a degree of extreme
cruelty or any of the fault grounds included in Idaho Code§ 32-605. Specific incidents testified
to are as follows:
a.

In 1994 one year after their marriage in 1993, the Rocky was shopping
with their daughter in a mall, purchasing a present for her mother, and
Rocky said if you spill the beans and spoil the surprise, I'll break your
face. (Objected to and overruled) (Tr. P. 27, L. 21-25 and P. 28, Lines 18)

b.

In 1995, seventeen (17) years ago, Rocky was accused of putting fist
through a door. (Tr. P. 31, L. 2)
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c.

In 1995, seventeen (17) years ago, Rocky said he was going to beat the
shit out of their daughter, and started after her. (Tr. P. 31, L. 12-23)
(Denied by Rocky Tr. P. 261, L. 1-9)

d.

Eighteen (18) months earlier when their daughter Casey was twenty-five
(25) years of age, she was in the hospital for four (4) weeks and Johnny
(Rocky) only visited her once. (Tr. P. 34, L. 25; P. 35, L. 1-5.)

e.

Debra was in the hospital October 2008 to have gallbladder removed,
Rocky didn't come to the hospital. (Tr. P. 35, L 7-24) Rocky testified that
he had recently had organ transplants, and was taking anti-rejection
medication. Rocky was advised to stay away from ill people. Rocky had
her dog taken up to visit her, and talked to her every day by phone.

f.

Debra alleged that Rocky went to the barn to commit suicide after he
learned of her affair and her request for a divorce. Debra testified police
came and took him to the Behavioral Health Center. (Tr. P. 37,
L. 12-22) Debra also testified that Rocky had threatened suicide three
times before. (Tr. P. 38, L. 16-19) Rocky testified that he did not, but that
Debra was encouraging him to, and giving him alcohol to drink.
(Tr. P. 222, L. 10-18; P. 223, L. 7-13; P. 224, L. 7-10.) He testified that he
has never threatened suicide. Rocky admitted that he loved his wife very
much, and felt like he would die without her. Rocky testified: "I'll die if
you go, I meant that's the way I feel. I feel like I am dying right now"
(Tr. P. 393, L. 1-4)

g.

Debra testified that after she filed for divorce, she moved downstairs in the
basement, and Rocky took her clothes and put them in plastic bags and put
them in the yard, where she picked them up. (Tr. P. 39, L. 1-11) Rocky
testified that she was leaving the home and spending the weekends with
her boyfriend and lying to him about it. Finally he put her clothes in bags
and sat them on the front porch. Rocky did not throw them on the yard.
(Tr. P. 265, L. 1-25; P. 266, L. 8-10). Rocky indicated he was very, very
sad and depressed, and asked her what he had done wrong. Debra never
explained or told him. (Tr. P. 266, L. 25; P. 267, L. 1-15)

h.

Debra testified that eighteen (18) months ago when her adult daughter
Casey came home from the hospital, she entered the bedroom where
Rocky was without asking permission and Rocky became angry at her.
(Tr. P. 34, L. 18-24)
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Rocky's attorney renewed his motion to strike all of the "fault" testimony, which was
denied. (Tr. P. 39, L. 20-25; P. 40, L. 1)
It is submitted that that if all of the allegations were completely true, that Rocky's
behavior falls far short of extreme cruelty or any fault ground recognized by Idaho law.

K. THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING
MAINTENANCE WITH PUBLIC WELFARE
Rocky is asking this court for justice and fairness. Rocky wants to live a productive life.
As the court in Hentges, supra, stated, he simply wants his wife of nineteen (19) years to have
the consideration and decency to help him financially such. In this sense it gives him, so far as
money suffices, a measure of dignity and independence that healthy people take for granted.
Rocky is 57 years old, disabled, blind and alone, after 19 years of marriage. The wife
that he loved dearly left him for another man with whom she resided during the last year of
marriage. These events are horrific for Rocky, but not as horrific as the thought that the
magistrate sees him as a useless human being that should be put in a nursing home to die.
His wife of nineteen (19) years makes nearly $100,000.00 per year; has paid vacations,
insurance, an expensive recreational vehicle with pickup to pull it to enjoy with her boyfriend.
She has many years ahead to work. Debra is 53 years old, and will make approximately 1.3
million dollars in the next 13 years before retirement.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The combination of marriage vows, long term marriages, age and disability are critical
factors in the life of a married couple. Few of us can ever comprehend the strength it takes for
Rocky to face each day, and the strength to fight depression and futility.
Rocky does not ask for recreational vehicles, expensive vacations, fancy cars, fancy
dinners, nice clothes, an expensive house, nor most of the things most of us enjoy. Rocky wants
to have value, dignity, a place to live, visit friends, go to church and eat. Rocky is asking for
alimony for his basic needs. Rocky has been independent all his life. Rocky has a meager
amount of money from the property division which will be depleted quickly. Once Rocky
cannot pay for his living expenses, he will be forced into Medicaid, where he will spend the rest
of his life in a nursing home. If the reader has visited a nursing home, he or she has an
immediate understanding of the life and home one experiences. Nursing homes are a necessary
but sad end to one's life. Rocky is not old, and wants to live as productive and active a life as he
is able.
The court obviously has perceptions and attitudes about Rocky, which permeate the
Memorandum Decision throughout. Rocky did not receive a just and fair result at trial.
Rocky asks this court for relief. Rocky requests the house be listed for sale at a minimum
price of $300,000.00; that he be permitted to live in the home until it sells. Rocky requests that
the parties reduce the price periodically if necessary. If after ten (10) months of listing there are
no offers in excess of the mortgage balance at that time, the Debra may have the home, subject to
her refinancing it within a reasonable time. Rocky asks the court to award him substantial
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maintenance to assist him in living a reasonable life. Rocky needs this to be permanent
maintenance. Rocky further requests the court order an equalization payment and attorney fees
for the trial below and for this appeal. It is not unreasonable to request his wife of 19 years to sell
the home, luxury items, stop her savings, and pay a substantial amount for alimony so he too can
have a semblance of the life most ofus enjoy.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of December, 2013.

Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day I served two copies of the foregoing document
upon the designated parties affected thereby as follows:

Laurie Baird Gaffney, Esq.
Gaffney Law Office, PLLC
591 Park Avenue, Suite 302
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

X U.S.MAIL
FAX (208) 524-6301
HAND DELIVERY
COURTHOUSE BOX
EXPRESS DELIVERY
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DATED this 23rd day of December, 2013.

Attorney for Appellant
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